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Abstract 
The personal identification in mobile scenarios has attracted a lot of attention in the last few years due to the 
emergence of new communications paradigms that enable the establishment of ad hoc communications. These 
communications must be carried out in a secure way since they can be involved in applications such as payments and 
access systems. Consequently, new secure systems should be proposed for managing security in such complex, 
mobile and variable conditions. This paper proposes a new authentication system based on the Spanish ID card and 
the wireless NFC (Near Field Communication) technology. It uses cryptography techniques and authentication 
certificates to establish secure communications between two interlocutors. The proposed network oriented 
architecture enables the proposed authentication system to operate in both local and remote modes.        
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1. Introduction 
New security threats have emerged due to the recent growth of mobile computing and the intensive use 
of Internet. The birth of new communication paradigms like the Internet of things (IoT) envision a world 
full of connected devices capable of exchanging information through Internet. The communications 
among such mobile devices must be carried out in a secure way so the identification of the interlocutors 
taking part in any communication is required. This identification process in existing networks is a 
complex mechanism that introduces new secure systems for authenticating interlocutors in mobile 
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scenarios. National Governments have joined this scenario during the last decade, modifying the existing 
identity (ID) cards to include the electronic identification of citizens, eID cards. 
This is the case in Spain, where people are normally indentified by their personal ID cards. These cards 
are currently issued by the national government, containing electronic personal information that can be 
used for identification purposes. The Spanish government is currently promoting the use of the eID cards 
distributing the API for developing new services based on it [1] and offering free training courses [2]. In 
addition to these resources, it can also be found a complete Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI) based on the 
Spanish eID card and the suitable management of digital certificates included in them. This infrastructure 
is supervised by the Dirección General de la Policía, DGP from now on, which is part of the Ministry of 
Interior [3]. With regard to developers, it provides a low cost method for personal authentication without 
any additional maintenance. It is worth pointing out that the electronic advanced signature is considered 
like the handwritten signature by the Spanish law. This electronic personal certificate is normally 
validated using offline methods that require the public certificate of the certification authority [4]. Also, 
services as validation authority are offered through the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) [5] that 
improves the process with an updated certificate revocation list. 
There are multiple devices and authentication systems which can take advantage of this infrastructure 
like cash machines, digital television receivers, mobile adapters, etc., but time constrains normally limit its 
use. Short range wireless technologies can facilitate the use, enabling the establishment of ad hoc 
communications between two interlocutors. Among them, NFC has drawn a lot of attention in the last 
decade due to their suitable features in secure access applications. In this paper, the Spanish eID card and 
the NFC technology are joined to develop a new security access system, where the NFC technology is 
used as an enabling technology to establish wireless ad hoc communications. The proposed system uses 
cryptography techniques to establish a secure communication link and relies on the Spanish PKI to get the 
personal authentication. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the PKI concept and some interesting 
cryptographic methods. Section III analyzes the Spanish eID card, while the NFC technology is studied in 
section IV. The presented application that combines NFC technology and the Spanish eID card is shown 
in section V. Finally, some conclusions are drawn in the last section of the paper. 
2. Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI) 
PKI is a security infrastructure that incorporates hardware, software, standards, and policies to create a 
framework for securing transmissions, verifying and validating identities, and ensuring the integrity and 
source of data through the use of asymmetric encryption and digital certificates [6]. It was proposed to 
solve the problems with the secure key exchange arisen with the use of symmetric key algorithms 
[7][8][9] and in addition, the “man-in-the-middle” (MITM) [10] vulnerability exhibited by the public-key 
cryptosystems [11]. The PKI concept was included in the X.509 ITU-T recommendation [12] which 
suggests the following characters [13]: 1) Certificate Authority (CA), 2) a security policy, 3) Registration 
Authority (RA), 4) certificate repository and distribution system, and 5) PKI-enabled applications. 
Basically, it is based on the suitable management of digital certificates. Digital certificates are issued by 
CAs and they are mainly composed of a private key, a public key and a document created following the 
X.509 standard, which is also known as X.509 certificate, and is signed previously by a CA. The veracity 
of certificating relies on the CA, if the CA and its methods can be trusted, then the certificate will be also 
trusted. It is interesting to know the content of a X.509 certificate, illustrated in the Figure 1.  
Following the aforementioned characters of a PKI infraestructure are particularized in the Spanish 
case: the DGP acts as a root the CAs, its certificates are auto-signed [14] with a validity of thirty years, 
and it issues the certificates of the subordinated CAs with a validity of fifteen years. Currently, there are 
three subordinates CAs, their main function is to issue the digital certificates of the Spanish eIDs. The 
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From the point of view of the digital data included inside DNIe chip, the information is divided into 
three different security levels which are in read-only access. These levels are: 
• Public zone (without restricted access): CA intermediate issuing certificate, holder public keys, 
component certificate. 
• Private zone (access with PIN): Holder signature and authentication X.509v3 certificates and 
holder private keys. 
• Security zone (only accessible through police equipment): Electronic information which is the 
same than that physically written, biometric data, and the device serial number. 
 
The DNIe is considered a Secure Signature Creation Device (SSCD) according to the Common 
Criteria EAL 4+ in the protection profile CWA 14169 [17] certified by the ETSI, the RFC 3739 and the 
European directive 99/93/EC [18].  
Now we are going to focus on the holder signature certificate since it is used in the proposed 
application. The purpose of the signature certificate is to allow the citizens to have the possibility of 
digitally signing transactions and documents, guaranteeing both integrity and authorship. To get the 
signature certificate is necessary to insert the holder PIN over a trusted channel [17] with the SSCD. Each 
signed task has to be authorized by the DNIe holder since the advanced electronic signature is compared 
to the legal hand signature [19], [20]. Notice that the electronic advance signature has the same validity of 
the legal hand signature. Therefore any application must always notify a user what and when a document 
will be signed. The certificate included in the DNIe follows the standard X.509v3.  
 
4. Near Field Communication (NFC)  
NFC is a set of standards for short-range communications. NFC has attracted much of attention during 
the last few years and it is estimated that by 2015 today's market value will be increased by eight times 
[21]. As a rule, in NFC communications there is an initiator and a target device. Both devices can operate 
in passive or active modes. In the active mode the devices must be supplied by batteries. In the passive 
mode, the target device uses the energy transported by the electromagnetic waves to send back a response 
to the initiator. The number of applications in which NFC technology is used is large, including 
applications such as secure payment tools, access management, and retailing industry among others. 
Furthermore, NFC is envisioned as an enabling technology for the Internet of Things [22]. 
In this paper we focus on peer-to-peer communications over NFC links. In peer-to-peer 
communications nodes work in the active mode. Figure 3 represents the NFC stack used in the proposed 
application to establish peer-to-peer communications between two NFC devices (NFC dongles). The 
Logical Link Control Protocol (LLCP) allows two types of peer-to-peer communications, connection-
oriented transport and connectionless transport. While in the former the transmissions are guaranteed via 
ACKs, in the latter the transmissions are not guaranteed. For this reason, the connection-oriented 
transport has been chosen.  
The nfcpy API has been used to code the programs responsible for managing the NFC communications 
[23]. This API, which is written in Python, allows users to define LLCP sockets with connection-oriented 
transport.  
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Fig. 3. NFC stack 
5. Application: Secure Access System 
In this paper we propose an application which identifies people carrying a DNIe using NFC links. The 
authentication is possible through the X.509 certificates included inside the DNIe. The proposed 
application enables the authentication and non-repudiation of the DNIe holder at the access moment 
thanks to the advance electronic signature. In addition, NFC links are used to exchange the application 
data through peer-to-peer ad hoc communications.  
 
5.1 Application Architecture 
 
The proposed application is based on a client-server model [24], see Fig. 4 (client APP-Server APP). 
While the server APP is responsible for granting the access, the client APP has a DNIe attached as a local 
resource. The communication between the server APP and the client APP was done by NFC links using 
LLCP protocol. Both the client APP and the server APP have been divided into two different types of 
entities, namely NFC entities and APP entities. The first type of entities makes possible the NFC peer-to-
peer connections and the APP entities control the encryption/decryption involved in the authentication 
procedure at application level. Both entities communicate with each other through TCP/IP sockets.  
 
 
Fig. 4. Network Oriented Architecture 
 
The NFC gateways entities were programming in python using the NFCpy API [23] and the LLCP 
protocol, which provides a mechanism to establish peer-to-peer connections between two NFC devices. 
The NFC entities are in charge of exchanging the information needed by the authentication procedure. 
The NFC entities also follow a client/server architecture based on LLCP sockets. While the initiator acts 
as a server NFC, the target functions as a client NFC.  
The client and server applications were programmed in JAVA using the Spanish Government JAVA 
controller for the DNIe [1] which provides an easy access to the DNIe resources. These entities manage 
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the authentication process [25] and implement a high level encryption to allow a secure connection 
among the server and the client.  
This network oriented architecture solves the different programming languages used by APIs (java and 
python) and provides the capability of running the application in both local and remote modes. On one 
hand, the local mode consists of running the client/server entities configured with the localhost IP 
address. On the other hand, in the remote mode, both client/server entities are configured with their actual 
IPs addresses that paired the different entities because the NFC devices are not connected to the same 
computers in which the client APP and server APP are running, see Figure 4. 
 
5.2 Communication among Entities 
 
A new protocol was created to communicate the entities both NFC and the APP entities. It was called 
MAP-b64 (Standing for Mark-up ACE-Ti Protocol base64), which consists of a serial of messages used to 
establish or disconnect the communications and also as a method to send the information codified in 
base64. All the messages are sent between the marks ‘<’ and ‘>’. If there is an error or simply the 
communication is successfully finished, the two escape characters <*> and <#> (see Figure 5), which are 
not included in the base64 dictionary, are used to close the communication or to report the occurred error.     
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Fig. 5. Message exchange in the secure access system 
The above Figure 5 illustrates the application functionality. It begins with establishing a 
communication between both APP entities and NFC entities, starting from client APP and server APP. 
The next step is the extraction of the signed certificate from the DNIe in the client APP side. On the other 
side, in the server APP, one pair of keys (public/private) is created to prepare a RSA encrypt process. 
Both, the client APP and the server APP are ready to try to connect to the paired NFC entities. The 
connection is established when the devices get closer. Then the server APP sends its public key and the 
client APP creates a symmetric DES [7] session key that will be sent to the server APP encrypted using 
its public key. As a result, a secure communication path between the server APP and the client APP is 
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achieved. After reaching this point, all the information will be encrypted through a DES encryption. The 
following step is to start the authentication process which is composed of the following tasks 1) getting 
the signed certificate, 2) sending a single per session MD5 [26] hash challenge, 3) the sign of the 
challenge and the challenge validation. If the mentioned tasks are correctly accomplished, the server will 
grants or refuses the access to the system.                  
 
6. Conclusions  
In this paper we have presented a new secure access system based on the Spanish DNIe and NFC. The 
novel system enables the exchange of crucial information through secure wireless peer-to-peer 
communications. The application architecture has been divided into two different types of entities, 
namely control APP entities and NFC entities. The former entities are based on a server-client 
architecture and they manage the security mechanisms used to safely exchange the data information such 
as the RSA encryption procedure and the DES session. In addition, they are in charge of the 
authentication procedure by using the certificate included in the Spanish DNIe. The NFC entities are 
responsible for establishing peer-to-peer communications between two NFC devices. The NFC entities 
perform as a wireless bridge to connect the control entities. Since the communication among entities is 
based on TCP/IP sockets, the proposed system can operate in both local and remote modes. In future 
works, this proposal will be adapted to new mobile applications in which the personal authentication is 
crucial. In addition, other wireless technologies like Bluetooth will be used instead of the NFC 
technology.   
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